Lena Connolly was cited in an article by James Francis called ‘People Power’, page 22 of the September 2019 edition of Financial Mail Office. Threats from Cybercrime are escalating. Humans are the weakest link, but they don’t have to be. Click on the link to read on. http://online.anyflip.com/enio/udax/mobile/index.html#p=24
By Jareth, EMISOFT Blog
(n.b.) Ed Cartwright and David Wall are cited in the following article.
Cybercriminals may be partially responsible for driving up the price of Bitcoin. It’s no secret that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have had an enabling effect on cybercrime. Now, we believe the inverse may also be true – that cybercrime, and ransomware in particular, is helping stimulate the cryptocurrency economy and inflating the value of Bitcoin. Bitcoin: a key part of the ransomware model Bitcoin has proven to be a tempestuous creature, climbing to an all-time high value of almost $20,000 in December 2017, dropping to below $3,500 in January 2019 and bouncing back to around the $10,000 mark today. While there are many factors behind these extreme fluctuations, we believe ransomware may be fueling the growth of Bitcoin. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim’s files. To regain access to the files, the victim has to pay a ransom, the cost of which can range from a few hundred dollars for home users, to hundreds of thousands of dollars for major corporations and public entities. The ransom is usually paid in cryptocurrency, and that cryptocurrency is usually Bitcoin. Bitcoin accounted for about 98 percent of ransomware payments made in the first quarter of 2019, according to figures from ransomware recovery specialists Coveware. As a result, Bitcoin has become an inextricable part of the ransomware model. . . . cont . . .
Please click here for the full article https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/33977/is-ransomware-driving-up-the-price-of-bitcoin/
Ransomware attacks on cities are rising – authorities must stop paying out
A ransomware campaign that targeted 23 US cities across Texas has raised serious concerns about the vulnerability of local governments and public services to cyber-attacks. These events come not long after similar attacks on governmental and business organisations in Indiana, Florida and elsewhere. They reflect a general shift in ransomware tactics from “spray and pray” attacks on large numbers of individual consumers, to “big game hunting”, which targets organisations, usually through people in positions of power.
A recent report from cyber-security firm Malwarebytes found a 363% increase in ransomware detections against businesses and organisations (as opposed to individuals) from 2018 to 2019. Put simply, cyber-criminals see an opportunity to extort far more money from organisations than individuals. Although the majority of ransomware attacks were found to occur in the US, local governments around the world are equally vulnerable.
Ransomware usually spreads via phishing emails or links to infected websites, relying on human error to gain access to systems. As its name suggests, ransomware is designed to block access to data, systems or services until a ransom is paid. At a technical level, cities tend to be fairly easy targets because they often have bespoke operating systems, with parts that are old and out-of-date, as well as ineffective back-up measures.
Cities also tend to lack system-wide security policies, so if cyber-criminals gain entry through one system, they can then access others and wreak havoc by freezing essential data and preventing the delivery of services. But even if organisations have improved their technical security, my research with my colleague Lena Connolly has found that few put equal emphasis on training employees to identify and resist attacks.
Employees in many small and medium-sized organisations, like local governments, often do not recognise their organisation’s true commercial value to criminals, and commonly think they are unlikely to be targeted. As a result, they might also develop bad habits – such as using work systems for personal reasons – which can increase vulnerability.
Offenders will do their homework before launching an attack, in order to create the most severe disruption they possibly can. After all, the greater the pressure to pay the ransom, the higher they can set the tariff.
Attackers identify key individuals to target and seek out vulnerabilities such as computers which have been left switched on outside of working hours, or have not been updated. Once they’ve worked out who to target, cyber-criminals deploy “social engineering” techniques, such as phishing, which psychologically manipulate victims into opening an email attachment or clicking on a link, which allows the ransomware programme into the organisation’s operating system.
To pay or not to pay?
Whether or not to pay the ransom is not a straightforward decision for city authorities with vital public services on the line. Most policing agencies instruct victims not to pay, but as Mayor Stephen Witt of Lake City, Florida, put it after his ward was targeted:
With your heart, you really don’t want to pay these guys. But, dollars and cents, representing the citizens, that was the right thing to do.
Another problem is that ransomware is not always deployed to extort money – so paying the ransom doesn’t guarantee that data will be restored. Attackers can have varying motives, skills and resources – working out their motive (often with very little information) is therefore crucial.
Rather than simply making money using ransomware, some cyber-criminals might seek to disable market competitors who provide competing goods or services. Or, they may use the attacks for political gain, to reduce public confidence in a local government’s ability to deliver essential services. In such cases, the data is unlikely ever to be restored, even if the ransom is paid.
Many cities are insured against attacks, and insurers often pay the ransom to retrieve stolen data – sometimes employing third party negotiators, against national advice. Ironically, the knowledge that cyber-criminals are likely to get paid justifies the time they spend researching their target’s weaknesses, and leaves the door open for repeat attacks. This was one of the reasons why cyber-criminals changed tactics and started targeting organisations in the first place.
This leaves city authorities a difficult choice, between paying to restore essential data and services (and encouraging cybercriminals) or admitting their systems have been compromised and facing up to social and political backlash. Even so, there are some measures city authorities can take to protect themselves, and their citizens, from ransomware.
Today, authorities need to assume that it’s a matter of when – not if – an attack will happen. They should install back up systems for protected data that have the capacity to replace infected operating systems and databases if need be. For example, in the UK, research found that 27% of local government organisations were targets of ransomware in 2017. Yet 70% of their 430 respondents had backup systems in place, in preparation for the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and could therefore recover from a ransomware attack much faster than their counterparts in the US.
Local authorities need to separate their data systems where possible and install appropriate levels of security. They also need to train employees about the nature of the threat and the impacts of their own actions when working within the organisation’s systems. They should also be aware of international schemes to prevent and mitigate ransomware (such as nomoreransom.org) – which provide advice and publish the keys to some ransomware online.
Public organisations must be able to think quickly and adapt to these new security threats – especially since cyber-criminals are always coming up with new techniques. Local governments need to be prepared to simultaneously prevent cyber-attacks, mitigate their effects when they do happen and bring cyber-criminals to justice.
David Wall talked to Radio Sputnik about the problem of Ransomware and the sucesses of the ‘No More Ransomware’ project. Run by a collaboration of cybersecurity organisations (inc EUROPOL) ‘No More Ransomware.org’ offers advice and software to recover computer files encrypted by ransomware and is claimed to have saved over 200,000 victims up to £86 million ($108 million).
Lena Connolly and David S. Wall,
The news out this week is that twenty-two US cities have been targeted so far in 2019 and that 170 county, city, or state government systems have been targeted by ransomware attacks since 2013. This is in addition to attacks on many thousands of corporate businesses. In response, 227 city mayors at the 2019 annual US Conference of Mayors pledged that they will not pay a ransom. The crippling crypto-ransomware attacks upon Baltimore, Lake City and Riviera Beach and various large multi-nationals such as Maersk, illustrate the increasing resilience of cybercriminals to maintain ransomware’s position as a major cybersecurity threat. It also illustrates that Cyber-security professionals need to get more cybercrime savvy about crypto-ransomware.
N.B. Links to The Rise of Crypto-Ransomware in a Changing Cybercrime Landscape
Connolly, A. and Wall, D.S. (2019) ‘Cyber security: Think like the enemy’,Computing , 16th July, https://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/opinion/3078977/cyber-security-think-like-the-enemy
A new paper under this title has just been published by Lena Connolly and David Wall in the journal Computers and Security.
Here is a summary of Connolly, A, and Wall, D.S. (2019) ‘The Rise of Crypto-Ransomware in a Changing Cybercrime Landscape: Taxonomising Countermeasures, Computers and Security. Available online, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101568
Each year the increasing adaptivity of cybercriminals maintains ransomware’s position as a major cybersecurity threat. Evidence of this shift can be seen in its evolution from ‘scareware’ and ‘locker’ scams through to crypto-ransomware attacks. Whereas ‘scareware’ used to bully victims into paying a fee to remove bad files, ‘lockers’ froze the computer until a ransom payment was made for a release code. Crypto-ransomware, in contrast, encrypts the actual data on the victim’s computer until a ransom payment is made (usually in bitcoin) to release it. In more recent malicious cases there is no release key, it is used as an attack weapon to permanently fry and disable the victims’ data, which can be devastating for the organisation involved and even more disastrous if it delivers national infrastructure.
Using primary and secondary empirical sources, this article draws upon candid in-depth interviews with 26 victims, practitioners and policy makers to explore their reactions to the shift in the ransomware landscape. Our research indicates that a subtle ecosystem of social and technical factors makes crypto-ransomware especially harmful, as a consequence there is no simple remedy, no silver bullet, for such a complex threat like crypto-ransomware. The attackers are increasingly doing their homework on organisations before they attack and hence, are extremely adaptive in both delivering their ever-developing ransomware. They are also tailoring their attack vectors to exploit existing weaknesses within organisations. Successful attacks combine scientific and social methods to employ a variety of ‘social’ techniques to get the malware onto the victims operating system. Techniques that include, for example, psychological trickery, profiling staff, exploiting technical shortcomings, areas of neglect by senior management and a shortage of skilled, dedicated and adaptive front-line managers – basically any opportunity available.
Our findings illustrate the nuanced relationship between technological and social aspects of crypto-ransomware and the organisational setting, indicating that a multi-layered approach is required to protect organisations and make them more resilient to ransomware attacks. Attacks, which are increasingly shifting from simple economic crimes of extortion, to disrupting and even destroying organisations and the services they provide. While the cybersecurity industry has responded to progressively serious ransomware threats with a similar degree of adaptiveness to the offenders, they have tended to focus more upon scientific ‘technical’ factors than the ‘non-technical’, social, aspects of ransomware. So, these observations suggest that organisations need to continually improve their security game more frequently and be as adaptive as the criminals in their responses to attacks. In order to achieve this goal, we developed a taxonomy of crypto-ransomware countermeasures that identifies a range of response tools, which arethe socio-technical measures and controls necessary for organisations to implement in order to respond to crypto-ransomware effectively. We then, identified the enablers of change, the groups of employees, such as front-line managers and senior management, who must implement the response tools to ensure the organisation is prepared for cyber-attacks.
Our research findings, therefore, will not only assist Police Officers working in Cybercrime Units in further understanding the perspective of the victims and also the impacts of crypto-ransomware. But, they have important practical implications for IT and Security managers and their organisations more generally (some of which are police). The taxonomy provides a blueprint for systematising security measures to protect organisations against crypto-ransomware attacks. Managers need to select controls appropriate to their specific organisational settings, for example, the ‘business-use only’ of IT resources is necessary in some organisations, such as commercial organisations, while not practical in others such as research institutions. Also, face-to-face security training, for example, may be more possible and effective in smaller organisations than large ones. The taxonomy also underlines the importance of embedding appropriate ‘social’ based controls in organisational cultures rather than simply focus upon technical measures. This is because, as indicated above, inappropriate measures, skills and support led to incidents occurring, some of which were particularly devastating. Furthermore, the taxonomy underlines the crucial role that mid-level managers play in responding to crypto-ransomware threats.
The skills set for competent front-line management also goes beyond being security and IT-savvy, to becoming organisationally adaptive and to think like ‘the enemy’. Security professionals are not only required to be influential mid-level leaders who can change attitudes and behaviours in organisations by cultivating certain cultural traits. They have to understand both cultural factors and human behaviour and express this understanding in practice to succeed in their role. In return, senior management must be IT-competent and be effective in overseeing the IT functions of their organisation. Senior managers represent an important part of the security chain in organisations and need to support the efforts of mid-managers. Ultimately, both levels have to respect each other’s position to work together co-own the problem to co-produce the solution – something that is easy to say but hard to put into practice. Our future plan is to convert the taxonomy into a more user-friendly tool, similar to the Cyber Essentials self-assessment instrument.